Introduction cooperative game theory

It is written to be accessible to anybody with high-school level knowledge of mathematics. At the end of each chapter there is a collection of exercises accompanied by detailed answers.

There is a total of more than exercises. The book is richly illustrated with approximately figures. Ordinal games in strategic form Perfect information games General dynamic games Expected Utility Strategic-form games Extensive-form games Common knowledge Adding beliefs to knowledge Common knowledge of rationality Appendix 9.

E: Exercises [7 exercises]. S: Solutions to exercises. Weak Sequential Equilibrium Advertisement Hide. This service is more advanced with JavaScript available.

Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games. Detailed analysis and unified axiomatic treatment of the main solutions of cooperative games, both with and without side payments Suitable for introductory and graduate courses on game theory Includes supplementary material: sn. Pages Front Matter Pages Coalitional TU Games and Solutions. The Core. Bargaining Sets. The Prekernel, Kernel, and Nucleolus.

The Prenucleolus. The Shapley Value. Continuity Properties of Solutions. Cooperative Games in Strategic and Coalitional Form. The Consistent Shapley Value. Back Matter Pages About this book Introduction This book systematically presents the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games, and the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games.

Beard, Economic Record "The text provides a thorough, detailed, rigorous, precise and complete account of the axiomatic treatment of solution concepts of cooperative games.